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ABSTRACT 
Researcher: William Lawrence Jagnow 
Title: Voluntary and Confidential Reporting Systems as a Means of Reducing 
the Accident Rate in Shadow 200 Flight Operations 
Institution: Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
Degree: Master of Science in Aeronautics 
Year: 2007 
Although effective, the United States Army's Shadow 200 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle has 
suffered an unacceptably high accident rate. Errors committed by operators have 
significantly contributed to this accident rate. The voluntary and confidential Aviation 
Safety Reporting System and Aviation Safety Action Program have been successful in 
identifying and addressing errors committed by air carrier pilots. This study has explored 
the implementation of voluntary and confidential reporting systems in Shadow 200 flight 
operations. Mixed methods research combined quantitative survey data and qualitative 
interview data as a means of determining attitudes relevant to the implementation of such 
systems. Identified deficiencies included: (a) Checklist errors, (b) misunderstanding of 
the Operational Hazard Report, (c) reported errors resulting in negative responses, and (d) 
Shadow operator perceptions of existing error reporting systems. Recommendations have 
been made relevant to remedying these deficiencies, improving the safety culture in the 
Shadow community, and conducting further research on related topics. 
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Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION 
This study has represented an application of concepts from civil aviation in a 
military setting. As such, the extensive use of military terminology has been unavoidable. 
Certain words have been capitalized that have not been capitalized in non-military 
writing (e.g., Soldier, Aviation). This also has been due to military convention. 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Accident Rate Reduction 
Military operations always have been inherently risky. Nevertheless, the 
elimination of avoidable accidents has been important to the United States (U.S.) Army. 
Accidents in military operations have been costly in terms of dollars, equipment, and 
personnel. This situation has impacted the ability of the U.S. Army to perform its 
mission. The U.S. Army Combat Readiness Center (CRC), formerly known as the Safety 
Center, has been charged with collecting, analyzing, and acting upon safety-related data. 
According to the CRC, "each life saved, each serious injury avoided, and each piece of 
equipment undamaged may be the deciding factor in a battle in the Global War on 
Terrorism" (U.S. Army, 2006a, p. 5). 
Given the risky nature of military operations, one of the great advantages of 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) has been the fact that they are by definition 
unmanned. Due to the increased frankness with which the media has depicted war, 
casualties have not been as easily accepted by the public as they were in past wars. The 
U.S. Army has become less accepting of casualties as well due to increased 
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socioeconomic pressures such as the cost of training Soldiers. Having studied the 
changing attitudes in American culture toward casualties in the 20th Century, Eikenberry 
(1996) noted that: 
In the language of an economist, America had a comparative advantage in capital, 
and was at a comparative disadvantage in labor. With equipment and technology 
relatively cheap and manpower dear, both economically and politically, it 
followed that personnel losses would come to be considered as increasingly 
expensive. America's political leaders variously captured and lost the prize 
because of their policies during the Korean and Vietnam wars. As casualties 
mounted in both contests, the electorate increasingly asked what vital interests 
were at stake to justify the human and economic sacrifice. Both wars led to the 
defeat of incumbent political parties. The lesson learned for all was that it was 
politically risky, if not suicidal, to preside over any limited conflict that could not 
be won quickly, with relatively few casualties. The successes of our military in 
combat actions in the 1980s and 1990s were no doubt a reaction to Korea and 
Vietnam, as civilian leaders resolved to use armed force only when we could 
achieve victory with little loss of life. Yet the extraordinary results may have 
created strong, and quite possibly unrealistic, expectations among the general 
public and civilian leaders that armed conflict, properly managed, can usually be 
waged with little loss of life. (p. I l l ) 
In addition to the loss of human life and degraded unit morale incurred when any Soldier 
has been killed, each pilot has represented a considerable monetary investment for the 
U.S. Army. Pilot training has been expensive; the initial training of an Army helicopter 
pilot has cost an average of $225,000 (Colucci, 2002). UAVs have circumvented the 
complications inherent in putting a pilot in danger by physically removing the pilot from 
the aircraft. 
Despite the absence of a pilot in the aircraft, the loss of a UAV has not been 
without impact. A destroyed UAV could not be used to fly a mission. The RQ-7A 
Shadow 200 has become the Army's most prevalent UAV. The loss of Shadow 200 
UAVs has had a definite impact on the effectiveness of the platoons operating them. 
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A Shadow platoon missing one or more of its aircraft had to work harder in order 
to keep its remaining UAVs in a mission ready condition. Shorthanded platoons had to 
expedite procedures such as between-flight turnaround inspections in order to ensure that 
a UAV could be on station when it was required. Overall, a Shadow platoon missing an 
aircraft has felt an increased workload that has been very acute when multiple UAVs 
have been lost. The loss of a single Shadow UAV in a platoon of four aircraft has 
dropped the platoon's mission capable rate to, at best, 75%; this has been worse than the 
comparable OH-58D Kiowa Warrior observation helicopter's historical mission capable 
rate of 80% (Geary, 2006) or the mission capable rate of 85% promised to the U.S. Army 
by the Shadow's manufacturer, per the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO; 
2005). 
In addition to the impact on mission readiness, the replacement cost of lost UAVs 
has been significant. Individual Shadow UAVs have been comparatively inexpensive. A 
single Shadow UAV had an objective cost of $452,000 (GAO, 2000), while the OH-58D 
Kiowa Warrior helicopter, which has performed similar missions, has cost nearly $30 
million dollars (Federation of American Scientists [FAS], 2000). However, the 
replacement of lost Shadows has been expensive. The Army signed an $11.4 million 
contract in September 2006 with Aircraft Armaments, Inc. (AAI), the Shadow's 
manufacturer, for partial replacement of aircraft lost in the Global War on Terror 
(Defense Industry Daily, 2006). Therefore, although they have been relatively 
inexpensive individually, the loss of multiple Shadow UAVs has become expensive. 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles have been very prone to accidents. As of 2001, UAVs 
had an accident rate up to 100 times that of conventional manned aircraft (Department of 
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Defense [DOD], 2005). The CRC defines Class B accidents as between $200,000 and 
$1,000,000 in recordable property damage, and Class C accidents as between $20,000 
and $200,000 of the same. The Shadow 200 UAV had 59 Class B and C accidents in 
fiscal year 2006 (CRC, 2006). These figures were out of a total fleet of approximately 
190 (Kappenman, 2006). As of 2005, the Shadow 200 had posted a Class B accident rate 
of approximately 190 per 100,000 flight hours (DOD, 2005). These figures compared 
poorly to an accident rate of 5 per 100,000 flight hours for Army rotary-winged aircraft 
(CRC, 2006). The Project Manager for Army Unmanned Aircraft Systems has called for 
a 50% reduction in the UAV accident rate every year for the next four years (Hazelwood, 
2006). Figure 1 has depicted the Shadow 200. 
Figure 1. The Shadow 200 UAV. 
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The Shadow 200 UAV 
The Shadow 200 has become the Army's most prevalent UAV. The Shadow 200 
was selected in 1999 to be the Army's Class IV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle. This Class 
designation gave the Shadow the task of supporting maneuver brigades, the Army's 
primary combined arms combat unit. In effect, the Shadow has been designated to 
perform missions requiring more capabilities than the smallest UAVs (e.g., the RQ-11 
Raven) but requiring more flexibility than the largest (e.g., the RQ-1 Predator). 
Description 
With an objective cost of $452,000 per aircraft, the Shadow was designed and 
manufactured by AAI, based in Hunt Valley, Maryland (GAO, 2000). The RQ-7A has 
been the original production model of the Shadow 200, and the RQ-7B has been a 
slightly upgraded version with better performance to include endurance and loiter speed. 
The Shadow 200 has performed the Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target 
Acquisition (RSTA) mission for the U.S. Army. In practical terms, this has included such 
missions as (a) enemy observation and reporting of size, disposition, and movement, (b) 
target detection and acquisition, (c) identification of key terrain such as avenues of 
approach, and (d) Bomb or Battle Damage Assessment (U.S. Army, 2006b). Army Aerial 
RSTA has been performed by a multitude of aircraft in a primary or supplementary 
capacity. Primary manned RSTA aircraft included the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior and the 
OH-6 Little Bird. Table 1 has provided a brief description of the salient features of the 
RQ-7A and RQ-7B variants of the Shadow 200. 
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Table 1 
Salient Features of Shadow 200 UA V (Adapted from DOD, 2005) 
Leneth 
Gross Weight 
Fuel Capacity 
Engine Make 
Endurance 
Ceiling 
Sensor 
Wing Span 
Payload Capacity 
Fuel Type 
Power 
Max/Loiter Speeds 
Datalink Radius 
TakeoffTLandine 
RQ-7A 
11.2 feet 
3271b 
511b 
RQ-7B 
11.2 feet 
375 1b 
731b 
UEL AR-741 
5 hours 
14,000 feet 
7 hours 
15,000 feet 
Electro-Optical (TV), Infrared (IR) 
12.8 feet 
60 lbs 
14 feet 
601bs 
MOGAS 
38 hp 
110/70 kts 
68 nm 
38 hp 
105/60 kts 
68 nm 
Catapult / Arresting Wire 
Advantages 
The Shadow 200 has enjoyed several advantages in the RSTA role over 
traditional manned aircraft. Although exact figures are not available, the Shadow 200 has 
performed the same missions as manned reconnaissance aircraft at drastically reduced 
costs. A complete Shadow system, including four UAVs and all the associated ground 
equipment, has cost approximately $10 million (Swibel, 2006). By comparison, the OH-
58D had a replacement cost of nearly $30 million (FAS, 2000). The Shadow has required 
less fuel, less maintenance, and a smaller logistical chain. As a result of the cost and 
logistical advantages, the Shadow has been able to remain over a target (providing 24-
hour observation) with less degradation of pilot and machine than comparable helicopters 
(N. D. Macchiarella, personal communication, May 26, 2007). The most obvious 
advantage of the Shadow, however, has been the absence of a pilot in the aircraft. The 
Shadow 200 has been able to operate in areas with an enemy air defense threat without 
fear of an American Soldier being placed in harm's way. Finally, it has been possible for 
entire Shadow system to be deployed using three C-130 transport aircraft. These 
advantages have made the Shadow an attractive choice as a reconnaissance aircraft. 
Combat Record 
The Shadow 200 has enjoyed considerable success in service with the U.S. Army. 
Shadow systems have deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan in support of a myriad of Army 
combat units, to include Special Operations Forces. Shadows had flown over 17,000 
sorties and upwards of 76,000 flight hours in combat by May 2006 (Spacewar, 2006). 
Shadow platoons from every Active Army division had deployed to Iraq as of March, 
2007, as well as platoons from National Guard divisions and separate brigades. Notably, 
Shadow platoons were involved in several high-profile operations conducted by the Joint 
Special Operations Command. Army Times credited Shadow 200 participation in the 
pursuit of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the head of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (Naylor, 2006). Satisfied 
with the performance of the Shadow 200, the Army had ordered 73 Shadow systems as of 
November, 2006 ("Shadow 200," 2006). 
Problems 
As capable as the Shadow 200 has been, it has demonstrated many limitations. 
Power and propulsion failures, problems with the datalink between the UAV and the 
Ground Control Station (GCS), and human factors issues to include excessively high 
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occurrences of operator error have contributed to a high accident rate (CRC, 2006). The 
Army has been aggressively pursuing solutions to these problems. 
Power and Propulsion 
Throughout its lifetime, the Shadow has been plagued by power and propulsion 
problems. Table 2 has provided a breakdown of Shadow engine failures in Fiscal Years 
(FYs) 2004, 2005, and 2006. 
Table 2 
Breakdown of Shadow Engine Failures (Adapted from CRC statistics, 2006) 
RQ-7A RQ-7B Total 
0 12 
14 30 
24 27 
3 3 
41 72 
It is important to note that the makeup of the Shadow fleet has had an impact on 
the numbers of engine failures each year. In FY 2004, the Shadow fleet was not close to 
its planned size; this situation resulted in higher usage rates and increased engine wear. 
Additionally, few if any RQ-7B models were fielded. The fleet size reached maturity in 
FY 2005. As FY 2006 came to pass, the majority of the fleet shifted to RQ-7B models. 
The FY 2007 numbers are as of November 15, 2006, and therefore have not reflected a 
complete year, as have the other figures. Nevertheless, the numbers above have 
represented a severe problem with the Shadow's AR-741 rotary engine, manufactured by 
British firm UAV Engines Limited (UEL). 
FY 2004 
FY 2005 
FY 2006 
FY 2007 
Total 
12 
16 
3 
0 
31 
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Datalink 
Problems have also existed with the link between the UAV and the GCS. Datalink 
failure during control station-to-station transfer resulted in the loss of two Shadows in a 
single mission. The first air vehicle was damaged due to a failure of the Tactical 
Automated Landing System, responsible for autonomously directing the Shadow on final 
approach for recovery. Following procedure, the operators issued a command to kill the 
engine of the stricken UAV. The command, however, was not accepted by the GCS's 
malfunctioning transmitting antenna. The same crew and GCS were then tasked to accept 
a second Shadow for recovery. Upon taking control of the second Shadow, however, the 
command to kill the engine was finally sent—resulting in the crash of the second air 
vehicle (Williams, 2004). Several other Shadows have been lost due to uplink-related 
issues as well. 
Human Factors 
Human factors-related issues have resulted in the loss of several Shadows. A 
report by the U.S. Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory stated that "human error 
plays a major role in U.S. Army UAV accidents" (Manning, Rash, LeDuc, Noback, & 
McKeon, 2004, p. 20). The report noted that 32% of Army UAV accidents between FY 
1995 and FY 2003 were attributed to human factors issues. Significantly, the report 
identified " . . . individual unsafe acts or failures as the most common human-related 
causal factor category, present in approximately 61% of the 18 human error related 
accidents" (Manning et al., 2004, p. 20). A detailed analysis specifically of Shadow 
accidents revealed that procedural errors occurred in 40% of the accidents studied 
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(Williams, 2004). Clearly, operator error cannot be ignored as a major contributor to the 
loss of Shadow UAVs. 
Statement of the Problem 
Although the Shadow 200 UAV has greatly enhanced U.S. Army combat 
operations by providing RSTA missions at lower cost and lower risk to Soldiers, the loss 
of Shadow 200 airframes has eroded the effectiveness of the system and, in turn, the 
effectiveness of the Shadow Platoon. These losses have made it more difficult for 
maintenance crews to keep the aircraft mission ready at best, and have rendered the 
Shadow platoon combat ineffective at worst. Losses also have decreased the system's 
cost effectiveness, as evidenced by the massive cost of procuring replacement airframes. 
In addition, the real possibility of a UAV accident severely injuring or killing a person 
has existed. 
Purpose of the Study 
Reducing the accident rate can positively impact the combat effectiveness and 
cost effectiveness of the Shadow UAV. The identification of errors committed by 
Shadow operators could assist in reducing the accident rate. There has been no research 
performed on using voluntary, confidential reporting systems, such as those employed in 
civil air carrier operations, as a means of identifying UAV operator errors. This study has 
examined how such reporting systems could best be implemented in Shadow UAV flight 
operations. 
Delimitations 
This study has focused on the Shadow 200 UAV. Although there were many other 
UAVs serving with the DOD, let alone the U.S. Army, only Shadow 200 flight operations 
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were studied so as to limit the scope of the study. (The researcher's personal experience 
was limited to Shadow operations.) Similarly, only Shadow operators were studied. 
Although maintainers and platoon leadership have also made errors resulting in accidents 
and incidents involving the Shadow, they were omitted from the study so as to reduce 
complexity. 
Likewise, only the principles of two individual-oriented reporting programs 
(Aviation Safety Action Program [ASAP] and Aviation Safety Reporting System 
[ASRS]) were discussed, explored, and used as models. Although there were other 
voluntary, confidential reporting systems, such as the Voluntary Disclosure Reporting 
Program, only those two reporting systems that have focused on reports by individuals 
were considered. This decision was made to reduce the complexity of the study. The 
implementation of voluntary and confidential self-reporting systems in Shadow flight 
operations was described in as much detail as the study permitted. Many of the details of 
implementation, both logistical and regulatory, were omitted so as to limit the length and 
depth of the study. 
Details about the participants that could be used to identify individuals (e.g., unit 
names and locations) were omitted to the greatest extent possible so as to protect the 
identities of the participants. Confidentiality was determined by the researcher to be a key 
factor in ensuring candid responses by the participants, given the potentially sensitive 
nature of some of the responses. The researcher felt that protecting the participants and 
justifying their faith in the utter confidentiality of the study took precedence over 
complete transparency of the methods. Similarly, the exact phrasing of interview 
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responses, as well as details used in the responses to include dates and locations, were in 
some cases de-identified by the researcher. 
By chance alone, all participants in the study were male. As such, the researcher 
made the decision to use the male "he" in all cases to describe the participants. This has 
been a matter of convenience and clarity only, and does not represent any bias on the part 
of the researcher. 
Chapter II 
REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
The DOD recognized the importance of improving safety and reliability in flight 
operations for all Unmanned Aircraft Systems. A great deal of effort has been exerted in 
two principal areas of concern. These areas of concern have been: (a) eliminating 
equipment deficiencies that cause accidents and (b) rectifying human factors issues that 
cause accidents. 
The Army has identified several aspects of the Shadow 200 that must be 
improved in order to increase safety and reliability. Some of these aspects were 
highlighted in a 2003 study by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), which 
identified key failure areas for the Shadow 200: power and propulsion, communications, 
and ground accidents (Schaefer, 2003). 
The OSD study had a wide range of suggested fixes for these problems. Remedies 
such as the substitution of lighter engine blocks, "heavy fuel" engines, or fuel-cell 
powered engines were suggested to resolve the power and propulsion issues. The use of 
electronically-steered array antennas in place of conventional, mechanically-steered 
antennas as well as solid-state amplifiers was recommended to solve datalink reliability 
issues. Ground reliability issues had no clear cut solutions (Schaefer, 2003). 
Mechanical changes to the Shadow 200 have been implemented or designed to 
reduce the likelihood of certain types of mechanical failures. Athena Controls, Inc. has 
designed and manufactured a new flight control system for the Shadow, the GuideStar 
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21 le. The newer RQ-7B variant of the Shadow features the UEL AR741-1100 series 
engine, which has been developed to replace the unreliable AR741 engine used on the 
RQ-7A (Parsch, 2006). Although the new flight control system has improved the 
reliability of the Shadow, the engine still has shortcomings, as highlighted by the engine 
failure accident statistics in Table 2. 
Analysis of human factors issues identified several problems but few solutions. 
One problem identified was the UAV operator's deprivation of sensory input from the air 
vehicle he is flying. Auditory cues were suggested as a possible remedy, but the tendency 
of these cues to increase the cognitive demands on the pilot offset any possible benefit 
(McCarley & Wickens, 2004). Augmented reality has been described as "a machine 
vision and computer graphics technology that spatially registers graphics over features in 
the observed world" (Majoros & Jackson, 2005, p. 2). 
McCarley and Wickens (2004) suggested augmented reality as a remedy, with 
benefits in accuracy and a reduction in cognitive demands. McCarley and Wickens also 
recommended a redesign of displays and a renewed focus on crew resource management 
training to resolve issues in crew workload demands. 
Aviation Branch Proponency 
The Shadow was formerly overseen by the Army's Military Intelligence branch. 
This presented many cultural challenges in supporting what was in many respects an 
aviation system. Recognizing this difficultly, the Army transferred proponency for all 
UAVs, to include the Shadow, to its Aviation branch. The Aviation branch has 
recognized many of the problems causing the Shadow's high accident rate, and has 
developed means to remedy these problems. 
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The Aviation branch has determined that a lack of cultural aspects common in 
manned aviation has contributed to the Shadow's high accident rate. Two factors targeted 
for improvement are the lack of mentorship for Shadow operators, maintainers, and unit 
leaders; and the lack of Aviation rigor (good practices, seen as basic or fundamental in 
Aviation) in Shadow training, maintenance, and operations (Buford, 2006). 
Moving Shadow platoons out of multi-purpose "Special Troops Battalions" and 
into Aviation brigades has been seen as an important step forward by leaders in the 
Aviation branch towards increasing safety in Shadow operations. Leadership in the 
Aviation branch has repeatedly emphasized the importance of instilling and emphasizing 
Aviation rigor or Aviation standards into the Shadow community. Terms such as 
discipline and culture have also been used to describe favorable aspects of the Aviation 
branch that must find their way into the Shadow community. Discipline while using the 
checklist or maintaining an accurate toolbox inventory were mentioned as practical 
means of implementing this culture (Buford, 2006). 
Solutions were also suggested by the Aviation branch not related to changing the 
culture in the Shadow community. Revision of the checklist so as to correct human 
factors shortcomings was suggested as a means of improving safety. An increased 
emphasis on crew coordination during training was also mentioned. Sending UAV 
warrant officers (i.e., technicians responsible for UAV operations) to the Army's 
Aviation Safety Course was also recommended (Hazelwood, 2006). 
Existing Solutions 
Materials solutions to the loss rate for Shadow UAVs have been many. However, 
these solutions have been most effective in solving the mechanical or physical problems, 
16 
and are of dubious use in reducing losses due to operator error or other human factors 
shortcomings. The Army has expressed an interest in reducing operator error, but has 
focused on sweeping changes in the culture of the UAV community. Although culture 
has been important, there has been no substitute for addressing the specific operator 
errors that have caused the losses of Shadows attributed to human factors. Voluntary and 
confidential reporting systems have been readily accepted as effective in identifying and 
helping to rectify such errors in air carrier operations. 
Voluntary and Confidential Reporting Systems 
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has developed several programs for 
gathering anecdotal data on flight operations and/or correcting observed deficiencies. 
Among these programs, two have focused on reports from individual operators. These 
programs are the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) and the Aviation Safety 
Action Program (ASAP). 
Aviation Safety Reporting System 
The Aviation Safety Reporting System was first instituted by the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in 1976. ASRS has allowed for 
voluntary, anonymous self-disclosure of errors committed while flying. The ASRS 
allowed NASA to gather a vast wealth of data about the state of airline safety. Per a 
memorandum signed by FAA and NASA administrators, ASRS has existed to "provide 
information to the FAA and the aviation community to assist them in reaching the goal of 
identifying and eliminating unsafe conditions to prevent accidents" (Connell, 2006, p. 4). 
ASRS reports have initially required a name and contact information for the 
submitter. However, the submitter has only been contacted to clarify information in their 
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report. Once this requirement has been met, the report has become totally anonymous. 
Submission of an ASRS report has also allowed the submitter immunity from FAA 
enforcement action for that incident, provided that certain criteria have been met. This 
privilege could only be exercised once every 5 years, although there has been no limit to 
how many ASRS reports could be made (Connell, 2006). 
ASRS data have been used for a variety of purposes. One use has been the 
creation of a searchable database. This database has been used to determine safety trends 
and causes for concerns by the FAA, as well as other purposes such as academic 
research. ASRS alerts have been issued in response to certain threats. These alerts have 
had an effect, as NASA has determined that 49% of recipients have taken action in 
response to them. The highest historical volume of report intake was recorded in 2005, 
with 40,657 reports submitted (Connell, 2006). One of the greatest strengths of ASRS has 
been the system-wide perspective. 
The restrictions in confidentiality and use of the data that made ASRS possible 
has also limited the amount of action possible based on the data implications. Although a 
centralized wealth of reports with a system-wide perspective has been created, the ability 
to respond to individual errors has been nonexistent. Nevertheless, the ASRS has resulted 
in an enormous wealth of data concerning errors committed by pilots. 
Aviation Safety Action Program 
The Aviation Safety Action Program was developed in response to the 
weaknesses of ASRS: the inability to respond to specific errors, and the centralized 
architecture. ASAP has established a level of confidentiality similar to the ASRS. (In 
fact, most ASAP reports have also been converted and submitted to ASRS.) Unlike 
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ASRS, the ASAP reports have been submitted to an Event Review Committee (ERC). 
This committee has enjoyed considerable latitude in their handling of the report. If the 
committee found that it did not meet the criteria for submission, they have been able to 
forward it to the FAA for administrative action. The ERC has also been able to contact 
the submitter for further information or counseling. Additionally, the findings of many 
submissions have resulted in fleet-wide publications to resolve a developing problem. 
The ASAP has used voluntarily submitted reports of aviation safety hazards to 
prevent future accidents. In exchange for reporting these risks, employees have been 
granted limited immunity from punitive actions, provided that their reports met criteria 
for submission. Reports have been used to identify risks and develop corrective actions 
for the reported risks. These corrective actions have ranged from individual counseling to 
company-wide publications. ASAP has also contributed to larger-scale actions to increase 
air carrier safety. Data from ASAP reports has been gathered into databases for analysis 
and/or combination with data from other voluntary, proactive safety programs. 
Basic Structure of an ASAP 
ASAPs have been created with Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs). The 
MOU has existed between three parties: the airline, the employee group, and the FAA. 
The ERC has employed a team approach in handling all submissions. Consensus has been 
required in any decisions made by the ERC (Kelley, 2006). Cooperation and mutual trust 
between these three parties has been crucial to the success of a given program. 
Confidentiality 
Reports submitted to ASAP have been largely confidential. The confidentiality 
and handling of an ASAP report has depended on whether it met the submission criteria. 
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Reports which have been a violation of certain regulations have been rejected outright by 
the ERC and forwarded to the FAA for possible punitive action. The criteria for punitive 
actions have been: 
1. Intentional violations of the Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs). 
2. Intentional disregard for safety. 
3. Any of the "big five" violations. 
(The big five violations have been defined as criminal conduct, substance abuse, use of 
controlled substances, alcohol use, and intentional falsification; Kelley, 2006). 
Confidentiality of ASAP reports has been achieved via de-identification. All data 
in a report that might point to a specific flight or employee has been stripped by the 
airline's ASAP program manager. The program manager has been the gatekeeper for 
ASAP reports. He or she has been empowered with de-identifying the data, as well as 
interacting on behalf of the airline with the employee group(s) and/or the FAA. Two 
instances have existed when the ERC could contact an ASAP report submitter. If the 
ERC needed more information about the reported incident, or if the ERC decided to 
individually train or counsel the reporter, then the reporter could be contacted. For all 
other purposes, reports submitted to ASAP have remained de-identified. 
Submissions 
Employees have had 24 hours to submit a report from the time they first became 
"aware of possible noncompliance with 14 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations)" (FAA, 
2002, p. 7). Submissions have typically been completed online, although some airlines 
have had a drop box at the airport where employees could leave handwritten submissions. 
All submissions have been processed by the air carrier's ASAP program manager. The 
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program manager has then forwarded de-identified copies of the report to the ERC, and 
the ASRS. Reports submitted to the ASRS have been converted into ASRS reports by 
NASA representatives. 
Some reports submitted to ASAP have resulted in timely corrective action. This 
has been one of the key differences between ASAP and ASRS. In ASRS, all reports have 
remained completely de-identified and resulted in no more than a database entry. Some 
ASAP reports have resulted in (a) counseling or training of individuals and/or (b) the 
publication of, and/or modification to, training procedures that have affected the entire air 
carrier (or the industry). As an example, Figure 2 has depicted a publication by United 
Parcel Service (UPS) resulting from their ASAP. This potential for timely corrective 
action has been one of the more notable advantages of ASAP as compared to the ASRS. 
The History of ASAP 
In the 1990s, a series of voluntary safety programs based on partnerships between 
the airlines, the pilot unions, and the FAA emerged. In 1990, US Air started an Altitude 
Awareness Program for the sole purpose of reporting altitude deviations. Alaska Airlines 
started a similar program in 1995. American Airlines started their Aviation Safety Action 
Partnership in 1994. This program was based on an agreement between American 
Airlines, the Allied Pilots Association (APA), and the FAA. The previous altitude 
awareness programs lasted one year each, accumulated reports numbering in the tens and 
hundreds, and only included altitude deviations. The American Airlines program lasted 6 
years, netted over 22,000 reports, and, most importantly, accepted reports covering all 
aspects of safety, not only altitude deviations (Kelley, 2006). 
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Figure 2. A Corrective Publication Resulting from the UPS ASAP Program 
(From Fahy, Kom, & Blankenship, 2006). 
The success of the American Airlines program prompted the FAA to create 
Advisory Circular (AC) 120-66 in January 1997, calling for an 18-month demonstration 
of a common Aviation Safety Action Program. The airlines, unions, and FAA were all 
satisfied with the outcome of this demonstration. In March 2006, the FAA issued AC 
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120-66A, which established guidelines for creating an ASAP and opened the program to 
industry-wide use. The convenience and success of ASAP have generated such a volume 
of reports that more than half of all ASRS reports originated as ASAP reports. 
The Event Review Committee 
The ERC has been integral to the ASAP. The ERC has comprised a representative 
from the air carrier, from the employee group (or labor union), and from the FAA. The 
FAA representative has been assigned by the Flight Standards District Office. After the 
ERC has received a de-identified ASAP report from an airline's program manager, the 
ERC has been able to contact the report submitter (if required for clarification or more 
data). Depending on the findings, the ERC could handle the issue itself or refer it to the 
FAA for administrative or corrective action(s). The ERC has been afforded some 
flexibility as to the handling of issues such as (a) repeat violations and (b) failures to 
submit an ASAP report when one has been required. However, some issues such as drug 
use or intentional falsification have been strictly relegated to the FAA and punitive 
measures (FAA, 2002). 
ASAP Performance to Date 
The ASAP has been very successful, as evidenced by the fact that no airlines have 
canceled their MOUs. Many programs have made significant contributions to safety for 
their airline. The UPS program, as an example, had 87 reports on altitude deviation 
submitted in the first quarter of 2006 alone. The same program resulted in corrective 
actions, including the: (a) retraining of an MD-11 crew on proper autopilot usage, (b) 
updating of a preferred departure routing, and (c) retraining of a marshaller on proper 
brake release hand signals (Fahy et al., 2006). 
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Patankar and his colleagues have extensively researched the applications of 
ASAP. As part of the research, they have gathered extensive data concerning employee 
attitudes toward ASAP. Patankar and Driscoll (n.d.) found that three times as many 
employees believed that ASAP increased the atmosphere of trust, as opposed to those 
who did not. Employees described company disciplinary action as "rare" due to the 
probable negative backlash of such enforcement action (Yorman, Patankar, & Ma, 2006). 
The findings of Patankar and colleagues have suggested that ASAP has created its own 
system of checks and balances. 
Relevance to Military Flight Operations 
Despite their success in civilian aviation, programs like the ASRS and ASAP 
have not been used in military flight operations as they have been in air carrier 
operations. The social and cultural dynamics of military aviation have been too different 
from its civilian counterpart. As an example, no analogue to the labor union or employee 
group has existed in the military. While it has been true that military aviators have been 
able to submit ASRS reports, evidence suggests that the ASRS has been generally 
misunderstood and under-utilized by them (Elliott & King, 2001). Nevertheless, it has 
been possible to use some of the important principles of these civilian reporting systems 
in military systems. These principles have been: (a) a limited exemption from punitive 
action when an operator reports his or her own error and (b) the use of reports to address 
errors committed during flight operations. 
Operational Hazard Report 
ASRS has been available for military use. Additionally, Army Aviation has 
developed a system for reporting aviation errors to supplement ASRS. This system has 
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been driven by the Operational Hazard Report (OHR). The OHR "identifies and 
documents an Aviation hazard before it leads to an accident" (CRC, 2005, p. 5). 
Additionally, copies of OHRs have been forwarded to the FAA or the National 
Transportation Safety Board (CRC, p. 16). 
The Army designed the OHR to complement and supplement the ASRS. To this 
end, accident prevention has been the only permissible use for OHRs. Use in punitive 
action, misconduct investigations, and similar actions has not been permitted by Army 
Regulation 385-10, which governed the Army Safety Program. Submitters have not been 
required to provide a name or contact information, but one has been encouraged if a 
response was desired (CRC, 2005). 
Despite the Army's best intentions, evidence has suggested that the OHR has not 
been utilized to its potential by Army aviators. Common problems of an OHR program 
have included: 
1. The program being "used, or perceived to be used, for disciplinary actions." 
2. Paying "lip service to complaints [sic].99 
3."OHRwar[5/c]." 
4. "Lack of emphasis during safety meetings" (CRC, 2005, p. 30). 
Just Culture 
The key to the success of the FAA's voluntary safety programs has been the just 
culture. Reason (1997) defined a just culture as "an atmosphere of trust in which people 
are encouraged or even rewarded for providing essential safety-related information, but in 
which they are also clear about where the line must be drawn between acceptable and 
unacceptable behaviour" (p. 23). The just culture that has existed between the FAA, the 
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airlines, and the unions has existed because of trust. Specifically, the FAA has asserted 
through a combination of regulations and laws, stated commitment, and historical proof 
that they will not use data collected through voluntary safety programs as a means of 
punishing well-meaning safety violators. The effect of the just culture has been circular, 
in that the perceived equity it creates has built trust, which in turn has made the just 
culture possible. 
The advantages of having a just culture, and the disadvantages of not having one, 
have been well documented. A study by a Global Aviation Information Network (GAIN) 
working group identified several benefits of the just culture, including: Increased 
reporting, trust building, and more effective safety and operational management. These 
benefits have resulted in many changes which increase the overall level of safety, as well 
as the efficiency of operations in some cases. Open communication about safety hazards, 
empowerment of line employees to deal with perceived hazards, and a wealth of 
additional data about hazards have been some of the benefits. As an example of the 
effectiveness of the just culture, changes to Denmark's laws regulating the reporting of 
air traffic control incidents led to an increase from 15 reports in the year prior to the 
change to 900 reports in the year after (GAIN, 2004). 
Summary 
The Army has addressed the Shadow's unacceptable accident rate through (a) 
material solutions and (b) a change in the culture of Shadow operators, termed Aviation 
rigor (Buford, 2006). However, the systematic identification and addressing of specific 
operator errors common to line operations, especially before they manifest as accidents, 
has not been adequately addressed. Civilian self-reporting systems for pilots, notable for 
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their voluntary and confidential nature, have been extremely successful in identifying 
similar threats in air carrier operations. It has been unknown if the Army's OHR system, 
analogous to the ASRS, has been effective in meeting this requirement, especially in 
Shadow flight operations. The just culture created by self-reporting programs has 
demonstrated benefits in terms of error reporting and improvement of the organizational 
safety culture. 
Research Questions 
The review of the literature has resulted in the following research questions: 
1. Are operator errors going unrecognized due to a fear of punishment? 
2. Do Shadow operators have any acceptable means of reporting their own 
errors; if so, are these means utilized properly? 
3. What challenges exist in implementing a self-reporting system for Shadow 
operators? 
4. How important is confidentiality to establishing a self-reporting system for 
Shadow operators? 
Chapter III 
METHODOLOGY 
This study gathered data from Shadow operators using a combination of two 
instruments: a survey and an interview. The survey gathered the demographics of the 
sample and determined the perception of a need for a voluntary, confidential self-
reporting system for operator errors in Shadow flight operations. The survey also 
identified cases that needed further exploration. Cases were identified as candidates for 
interview based on the researcher's judgment. The data from the survey and interview 
instruments were then interpreted to determine the need for, and challenges to, 
implementation of a self-reporting system for Shadow operators. 
Research Technique 
The study employed mixed-methods research techniques, utilizing both 
quantitative and qualitative data. Data gathering took place in two distinct phases: a 
survey instrument, and a series of semistructured interviews. This approach was chosen 
because it coupled the strengths of a survey instrument (more easily defined data and ease 
of administration) with the detailed responses, flexibility, and useful anecdotal data of 
interviews (Creswell, 2003). 
The survey had two distinct categories of items. The first category of items 
collected the demographics of the sample. The second category gathered Likert scale and 
other closed question data on the perceived need for and opinions regarding a self-
reporting system for Shadow operators. In that regard, the survey phase resembled a 
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concurrent nested research strategy. The second phase, the interview phase, sought to 
elaborate on the opinions and experiences of survey participants needing further 
examination. In this sense, the overall two-phase approach resembled the sequential 
explanatory research strategy (Creswell, 2003). The sequential explanatory strategy has 
gathered quantitative data first, such as the closed question survey items, and then used 
qualitative data gathering methods like the interview to explore some of the quantitative 
data further. 
The approach used in this study differed from a standard sequential explanatory 
strategy in that the survey-driven first phase had not been completed for the entire sample 
before the interviews were administered. Rather, interviews were administered once a 
cluster's (i.e., platoon's) survey phase was complete. In this sense, the survey-interview 
cycle occurred recursively for each cluster or platoon studied as part of the greater 
sample. This research design, although complex, was determined by the researcher to be 
the best means of exploring the subject. The researcher felt that the survey would: (a) 
increase the power of the study by increasing the sample size as compared to a strictly 
qualitative instrument, (b) increase the credibility of the study by offering quantitative 
data, and (c) assist in identifying appropriate participants to be interviewed. The 
interviews allowed for the exploration of subtexts that might not have been revealed by 
the survey, as well as a greater depth of responses than were offered by the survey. The 
overall study was exploratory in nature, and was guided by the theoretical perspective of 
identifying error through the use of self-reporting systems. 
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Research Design 
Shadow operators were enlisted soldiers and non-commissioned officers in the 
U.S. Army. Operators, per doctrine, constituted 14 personnel of a 23 Soldier platoon. 
More than 50 operational platoons existed in the Army, with the planned fielding being 
94 platoons (Kappenman, 2006). The U.S. Army perceived a need for reducing the erring 
propensity of Shadow operators, citing such factors as the absence of manned aircraft 
qualification from operator training and the lack of Aviation rigor in the Shadow 
community (Buford, 2006). The use of voluntary and confidential self-reporting systems 
was selected as a possible tool to augment this error reduction strategy due to its apparent 
success in the air carrier industry. 
The researcher was an Aviation Officer in the U.S. Army, and was experienced as 
an enlisted Shadow operator (to include a short combat tour in the Middle East). The 
researcher earned Instructor Pilot and Mission Commander qualifications while serving 
as a Shadow operator; graduate studies at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University were 
focused on aviation safety. Coursework was augmented by participation in an FAA safety 
conference as well as membership in the International Society of Air Safety Investigators, 
an organization for aviation safety professionals. 
Survey Sample 
Shadow operators have been both the participants and the beneficiaries of a 
prospective voluntary and confidential self-reporting system. As such, they were chosen 
as the population from which to draw a sample for the study. The researcher's intent was 
to influence the sample of Shadow operators to ensure an adequate level of experience. 
Shadow operators without experience in an operational unit (i.e., one that had performed 
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combat missions) were judged to be too inexperienced to have useful opinions regarding 
a self-reporting system. Thus, inexperienced operators who had not graduated from the 
introductory Army UAV operator's course at Ft. Huachuca, Arizona were omitted from 
the sample. The researcher desired a majority of the participants to have had combat 
experience as UAV operators, and for half of all participants to have qualifications in 
positions such as Mission Commander (MC), Instructor Pilot (IP), Crew Chief (CC), and 
Standardization Pilot (SP). 
The surveyed and interviewed operators were mostly found in Shadow platoons 
supporting combat units throughout the Continental United States. In addition to these 
operators in combat-operational units, operators in institutional units with previous 
experience in combat units were also studied. A convenience sample was selected, as at 
the time of study, the majority of combat Shadow platoons were deployed in support of 
the Global War on Terror. The units studied were located by Web search on official 
Army unit sites; platoons participated because they were cooperative and available for the 
study. (Only platoons within the Continental United States were chosen due to limited 
travel resources.) 
The survey was administered to 38 operators. The survey sample size of 38 
represented 5% of an estimated total population of 700 Shadow operators in combat 
units. The estimate of 700 Shadow operators was determined by multiplying the 14 
operator positions in a fully manned platoon by the estimated 50 platoons fielded in the 
U.S. Army in 2006 (Kappenman, 2006). This estimate of 700 was also reasonable when 
measured against a total population of 838 Army UAV operators, which included both 
Shadow operators and RQ-5 Hunter operators, as the majority of Army UAV operators 
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are Shadow operators (C. Damboise, personal communication, April 4, 2007). More than 
half of the respondents (52.63%) were not veterans of a combat tour as a UAV operator 
either in Iraq or Afghanistan. 
Of the 38 participants that completed a survey, 11 were selected for further 
examination in an interview. These 11 participants were selected for interview based on 
the researcher's judgment, and on responses to the open-ended item concerning errors the 
operator had made, and in some cases, not reported. Of the interviewees, eight were 
Instructor Pilot qualified and eight (not the same sample as the IPs) were veterans of a 
combat tour in either Iraq or Afghanistan. 
Study Design 
The survey and interview questions were developed specifically for the study; the 
instruments were designed to complement each other. The survey items and interview 
questions were designed to investigate the study's research questions. 
The Survey 
For the survey, no pilot study or pretest was determined to be necessary. This 
decision was based on confidence in the effectiveness of the instrument as well as the 
infeasibility of such a pretest or pilot study. A pretest was infeasible because the studied 
population, Shadow operators, were not present locally. The closest Shadow platoon to 
the researcher's home was at Ft. Stewart, Georgia, more than 200 miles distant. A copy 
of the survey questionnaire has been included as Appendix A. 
The survey questionnaire was divided into three sections: (a) demographics of the 
respondents, (b) Likert scale and other closed question items on attitudes regarding 
implementation of a self-reporting system, and (c) one open-ended item on the same. 
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Validation of the instrument was conducted with the assistance of the thesis committee 
chair. 
The Interviews 
The interview questions were developed so as to exploit relevant information 
suggested by the survey and generate in-depth, detailed qualitative anecdotes on the 
subject of the implementation of a self-reporting system. The interview questions were 
intended to provide prompts as a supplement for the researcher. The researcher's primary 
qualitative technique was to allow participants to direct the dialogue and ask questions in 
response to the participants. The interview questions have been provided as Appendix B. 
Cover Letter 
Before the survey was administered, a cover letter was distributed to each 
participant, including: 
1. The purpose of the study. 
2. That the study was voluntary. 
3. That all responses were confidential, and all participants would remain 
anonymous. 
4. That the study was not affiliated with the Army or Department of Defense. 
5. That the researcher was available to answer any questions. 
6. That a voluntary interview could have been conducted after the survey. 
This cover letter to the participants has been provided as Appendix C. 
Data Gathering Methods 
Surveys and interviews were administered in person during visits to Shadow 
platoons on Army posts. These visits were arranged and scheduled in advance. They were 
coordinated through the participating unit's platoon leader, and were scheduled so as to 
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minimize the impact on scheduled training activities for the participating unit. Permission 
was obtained to administer the surveys and interviews through proper coordination with 
the participating units' chains of command. The surveys and interviews were 
administered between March 19 and March 23, 2007. 
The surveys were administered to operators as they were afforded the opportunity 
to complete the survey during the work day. The researcher verbally briefed the 
participants on the proper completion of the survey. The surveys were conducted in the 
most private, distraction-free environment as could be found at the time; sites included an 
unused classroom, the outside wall of a hangar, and the unit's motor pool. Care was taken 
to ensure that participant privacy was maintained. 
Interviews were conducted under the same conditions as the surveys. Surveys 
with responses indicating a possibility for further exploration were used as a means of 
selecting interview candidates. The interview locations were subject to the limitations of 
the ongoing work day for the participants. A less formal and more relaxed atmosphere 
was developed via the camaraderie facilitated by the researcher's Shadow experience, 
thereby encouraging candidness and disclosure by the interviewees. (The researcher also 
introduced himself as a graduate student and eschewed military uniform and rank.) The 
interview questions were only used when the researcher felt the need to employ a prompt. 
Respondents were encouraged to discuss whatever they felt was relevant; questions asked 
by the researcher were more often follow-up questions to the responses than selected 
from the list of interview questions. This was chosen as the most effective means of 
gleaning information from the interview that might otherwise not have been obtained. 
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Treatment of the Data 
Completed surveys were examined to determine their usability. Responses from 
the survey were entered into a Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) 
database for storage and analysis. The quantitative survey responses were treated for 
correlation with the non-parametric Spearman's rho (rs). 
Qualitative responses were analyzed by the researcher in order to verify the 
intended meanings. Once the meanings of the qualitative responses were determined, 
responses were grouped together into common themes. The number of occurrences of 
responses following a given theme was tabulated. 
Chapter IV 
RESULTS 
This study used a survey as the primary data-gathering instrument. The survey 
was augmented by a follow-up interview. Respondents were selected for follow-up 
interview based on their responses to the survey and the judgment of the researcher. 
The survey comprised 28 items, with each item prompting only one response 
except for the 9th item, which required a total of four responses. Items 12 to 15 
determined the participant's perceived exposure to common operator errors such as 
altitude deviations or skipped checklist items. Items 16 to 27 were used to measure the 
participants' attitudes and experiences regarding error reporting. Item 28 was open-
ended, and allowed the respondent to describe any errors he may have observed and not 
reported. 
The allowance for open-ended responses to Item 28, as well as the follow-up 
interviews, provided anecdotal data, explored unusual responses, and enabled the 
participant to elaborate upon certain responses. The follow-up interviews were guided by 
a series of interview questions, although the interview questions were followed loosely, 
as the respondents often did not require much prompting. 
Demographics 
Items 1 to 11 were used to determine the demographics of the participants. 
Factors such as the respondent's level of experience and qualifications were measured. 
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Demographic 1: Age of Participants 
Participants' ages ranged from 19 to 46 years. Two respondents out of 38 
neglected to list an age. The mean (M) age of participants was 25.44 years, with a 
standard deviation (SD) of 5.56 years; only two respondents did not fall within one SD of 
the M Of the respondents, 94.44% fell between the ages of 19 and 31. Figure 3 has 
depicted the age distribution of participants who listed an age. 
20.00 30.00 40.00 50.00 
Age 
Figure 3. Participants' Age Distribution. 
Demographic 2: Rank of Participants 
Participants held ranks ranging from Private First Class (PFC) to Warrant Officer 
(WOl). The most common rank was PFC, followed by Staff Sergeant (SSG) and 
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Sergeant (SGT). The sample also consisted of two Corporals (CPL), a Specialist (SPC), 
and a Warrant Officer (WOl), who had recently been an enlisted UAV operator. Three 
individuals elected not to list a rank. Figure 4 has depicted the ranks of participants. 
Rank 
Figure 4. Participants' Ranks. 
Demographic 3 and 4: Readiness Level as an Air Vehicle Operator 
and as a Mission Payload Operator 
The currency and proficiency of Army Aviators has been measured by their 
Readiness Level (RL). The same has been true of UAV operators. Readiness Level One 
(RL1) has indicated that the operator is fully proficient and ready to fly without an 
Instructor Pilot. Conversely, Readiness Level Three (RL3) has been the lowest level of 
readiness for an operator who has completed the UAV operator's course. Readiness 
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Level 2 (RL2) has indicated that progress has been made towards RL 1, but that the 
operator has not reached that level of readiness yet. Shadow operators have progressed 
separately as an Air Vehicle Operator (AVO), controlling the flight of the aircraft; and as 
a Mission Payload Operator (MPO), controlling the aircraft's payload, typically a camera. 
Figure 5 has depicted the RL of the participants as AVO and MPO. 
AVO MPO 
Readiness Level by Position 
Figure 5. RL as AVO and MPO. 
Of the participants, 55.26% were RL3 as AVOs and 52.63% were RL3 as MPOs. 
RL1 was the next most common for both positions, with 31.58% for both MPOs and 
AVOs. Every participant listed a readiness level. 
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Demographics 5 through 8: Qualifications 
Shadow operators have performed duties in addition to AVO and MPO. These 
duties have included Instructor Pilot (IP), Mission Commander (MC), Crew Chief (CC), 
and Standardization Pilot (SP). Figure 6 has depicted IP and SP qualifications among 
respondents, and Figure 7 has depicted MC and CC qualifications among the same. 
Instructor Pilot Standardization Pilot 
Figure 6. Breakdown of Instructor and Standardization Pilot Qualified Operators. 
MC/CC 
Qualified 
0 N O 
D Y E S 
Mission Commander Crew Chief 
Figure 7. Breakdown of Mission Commander and Crew Chief Qualified Operators. 
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The most common qualification was MC, charged with directing missions, 
followed by IP, charged with instructing other operators. Less than eight percent of 
operators were Crew Chief qualified. All participants responded to all four items. 
Demographic 9: Hours Logged by Position 
Item 9 determined approximately how many hours participants had logged at the 
AVO, MPO, MC, and CC positions. Responses ranged from 0 to 1500 hours for AVO 
and MC. MPO hours ranged as high as 900. CC time was considerably lower with the 
highest value being only 7 hours. Only five participants listed any CC hours. Figure 8 has 
depicted the hours of participants at the AVO position. The Mfor the 37 participants who 
responded was 280.49 hours as AVO. One participant did not list hours for any of the 
four positions. 
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Figure 8. AVO Hours Logged. 
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The Mfor MPO hours was 232.38. Figure 9 has depicted the hours participants 
reported as MPO. More than half of the 19 participants with MPO hours that ranged from 
0 to 100 had recently graduated from the UAV operator's course, and had insufficient 
opportunities to accrue MPO hours. 
0.00 200.00 400.00 600.00 
MPO Hours Logged 
800.00 1000.00 
Figure 9. MPO Hours Logged. 
At the MC position, participants listed less hours on average than at AVO, with 
211.21 as the M Figure 10 has depicted hours reported by participants as MC. 
42 
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MC Hours Logged 
Figure 10. MC Hours Logged. 
Finally, with only five participants listing any CC hours and all responses being 
less than 10 hours, CC hours were determined to be insignificant for the purposes of this 
study. 
Demographic 10: UAV Operator Duties in a Combat Theatre 
Item 10 sought to determine if the participant had performed UAV operator duties 
in a combat theatre. In the Army, combat experience has been an important measure of a 
Soldier's experience level. The item prompted a simple yes or no response, and 47.37% 
of participants reported that they had performed UAV operator duties in combat. 
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Demographic 11: Graduation Date from UAV Operator's Course 
Another important measure of a UAV Operator's experience level has been how 
long he has been a qualified operator. All Shadow operators have been required to 
complete the Tactical UAV (TUAV) Operator's Course at Ft. Huachuca, Arizona. Item 
11 was an open-ended item allowing participants to list their graduation date from the 
aforementioned course. The graduation dates have allowed the researcher to determine 
how long the participants have been qualified operators. This metric has been one 
additional means of measuring the participants' experience levels. Figure 11 has depicted 
the distribution of graduation dates among the study participants. Two participants did 
not list a response. 
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TUAV Course Graduation Date 
Figure 11. Graduation Dates from UAV Operator's Course 
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The most common graduation date for the participants was June 29, 2006. Of the 
participants, 63.89% graduated after June 7, 2005. The earliest graduation date was June 
25, 2000, and the most recent was December 14, 2006. 
Research Items 
Items 12 to 28 sought to address the study's research questions (stated at the end 
of Chapter II). All of these items asked the participant to circle a response which best fit 
their experiences except for item 28, which was open-ended. Items 12 through 15 asked 
the participant to list their experience with four varieties of in-flight hazard, with possible 
responses of never, few, and several. No quantities were given for never, few, or several; 
instead, it was left to the respondent to determine which was most appropriate. 
Items 16 through 25 were Likert scale items determining the participants' 
attitudes regarding various aspects of error reporting. Possible responses were Strongly 
Agree (SA), Agree (A), Neither Agree nor Disagree (N; Neutral), Disagree (D), and 
Strongly Disagree (SD). Responses were assigned numerical values to aid in analysis, 
thus: SA = 1, A = 2, N = 3, D = 4, and SD = 5. Items 26 and 27 were yes or no items 
determining if the participant had ever not reported an observed error. Written responses 
to item 28 were followed up with an interview and data from the two sources has been 
indistinguishable. All closed question items were answered. 
The phrasing of items 12 to 28 was: 
12. How many times have you ever accidentally flown outside of your assigned 
altitude by more than 300 feet? 
13. How many times have you ever accidentally flown outside of your assigned 
airspace by more than 0.5 km? 
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14. How many times have you ever accidentally skipped a checklist item? 
15. How many times have you ever made any other type of error that would 
endanger the UAV, other aircraft, or any personnel on the ground? (Feel free 
to describe the incidents on the back). 
16. If I made one of the errors listed in items 12-15 and no one else saw it 
happen, I would not tell anyone. 
17. If I saw another operator make one of the errors listed in items 12-15 and no 
one else saw it happen, I would cover for him/her and not tell anyone. 
18. If my chain of command (Squad Leader, PSG, PL, etc) found out that I made 
one of the errors listed in items 12-15, there would be negative 
consequences. 
19. If a Mission Commander, Instructor Pilot, or the Standardization Pilot found 
out that I made one of the errors listed in items 12-15, there would be 
negative consequences. 
20. Our Instructor Pilot and/or Standardization Pilot helps us learn from our 
mistakes. 
21.1 am familiar with the Occupational Hazard Report. 
22. My platoon makes effective use of the Occupational Hazard Report. 
23. My platoon has an effective system for reporting hazards, errors, and 
incidents. 
24. If I made an honest mistake and I knew there would be no negative 
consequences, I would report making one of the errors listed in items 12-15. 
25.1 would report making one of the errors listed in items 12-15 if I could report 
it completely anonymously. 
26. Have you ever made one of the errors listed in items 12-15 and did not tell 
anyone? 
27. Have you ever seen someone else make one of the errors listed in items 12-15 
and did not tell anyone? 
28. If you answered "yes" to item 26 or item 27, please describe what happened 
below. If necessary, continue on the back. 
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Items 12 through 15: Operator Errors 
Before the reporting of errors was investigated, the propensity of the operator to 
error has been considered. Accordingly, items 12 through 15 sought to determine how 
often the participants had made some of the more common Shadow operator errors. All 
items allowed responses of never, few, and several. 
Item 12 asked the participant how many times he had accidentally flown off of 
their assigned altitude by more than 300 feet. Responses to item 12 are described in 
Figure 12. 
Figure 12. How Often the Participant Flew Outside of the Assigned Altitude. 
Item 13 asked the participant how many times he had accidentally flown off of 
their assigned airspace by more than 0.5 kilometers. Responses to item 13 are described 
in Figure 13. 
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Times Flown 
Outside Airspace 
Never 
Few 
Figure 13. How Often the Participant Flew Outside of Assigned Airspace. 
Skipped checklist items were addressed by item 14, which asked the respondent 
to describe how many times he had made such an error. Item 14 has been depicted by 
Figure 14. 
Times Skipped 
Checklist Item 
Never 
Few 
Several 
Figure 14. How Often the Participant Skipped a Checklist Item. 
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Occurrences of any other errors that might endanger the UAV, other aircraft, or 
personnel on the ground were determined by item 15, which also encouraged the 
respondent to describe the error on the back of the survey. Open-ended responses were 
combined with the data from item 28 and the interviews. Quantitative responses to item 
15 have been depicted by Figure 15. 
Figure 15. Occurrences of Any Other Error. 
Items 16 and 17: Response to Observed Errors 
Items 16 and 17 measured the participant's attitude towards reporting an observed 
error, assuming no one else saw the error happen. Item 16 asked the participant if he 
would tell anyone if he made one of the errors described in items 12 through 15. The 
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participants' responses were 73.68% Disagree (D) or Strongly Disagree (SD) for item 16. 
Results for item 16 have been depicted by Figure 16. 
A N E 
Would Not Report Own Error 
T 
SD 
Figure 16. Participant Would Not Report Own Error. 
Item 17 asked the participant if he would tell anyone if he observed another 
operator make one of the errors listed in items 12 through 15. Results for item 17, 
concerning reporting another's error, have been similar to those for item 16, with 76.32% 
of participants having chosen D or SD. For both items, more than 70% of participants 
selected D or SD in response to not reporting an observed error. Results for item 17 have 
been depicted by Figure 17. 
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Figure 17. Participant Would Not Report Another's Error. 
Items 18 and 19: Leadership's Handling of Errors 
In a Shadow platoon, there have been multiple authorities that an operator must 
respond to. The chain of command has consisted of traditional leadership positions such 
as the Squad Leader or Platoon Leader. In item 18, for the purposes of simplification, the 
Platoon Sergeant was also included in the chain of command despite the fact that he has 
fallen under the Non-commissioned Officer (NCO) support channel. Other leaders that a 
Shadow operator has been accountable to have included MCs, IPs, and the platoon's SP. 
Item 18 asked the operator if there would be negative consequences if the chain of 
command found out that the operator made one of the errors described in items 12 
through 15. If their chain of command found out about one of the errors described in 
items 12-15, 57.89% of participants felt that there would be negative consequences. 
Figure 18 has depicted the results for item 18. 
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Chain of Command Would Respond Negatively 
Figure 18. Participant's Chain of Command Would Respond Negatively to an Error. 
Item 19 asked the operator if there would be negative consequences if the MC, IP, 
or SP found out about the same errors as in item 18. Of the participants, 63.16% felt that 
there would be negative consequences if the MC, IP, or SP discovered the listed errors. 
Figure 19 has depicted responses to item 19. 
A N 
MC, IP, SP Would Respond Negatively 
Figure 19: Participant's MC, IP, or SP Would Respond Negatively to an Error. 
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Item 20: IP and SP Role in Learning from Mistakes 
A key facet of the operator's attitude towards error has been his perception of how 
the IP or SP would respond to error. Item 20 sought to determine how the operator 
perceived how the IP and SP would use errors. It asked the participant if the IP and/or SP 
help the operators to learn from their mistakes. Participants chose SA or A, that the IP 
and or SP helps operators learn from mistakes, in 89.47% of cases. Responses to item 20 
have been depicted in Figure 20. 
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Figure 20. Participant Feels that IP or SP Helps Operators Learn From Mistakes. 
Items 21 and 22: The Operational Hazard Report 
The OHR has been an Army mechanism for reporting non-accident data. 
Determining if the existing OHR is used correctly and effectively has been a vital step 
toward developing a functional voluntary and confidential error reporting system specific 
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to Shadow operations. Items 21 and 22 addressed this issue. Item 21 asked the participant 
if he was familiar with the OHR. Exactly 50% of participants agreed or strongly agreed 
that they were familiar with the OHR. An additional 11 participants (28.95%) neither 
agreed nor disagreed that they were familiar with the OHR. Figure 21 has depicted results 
for item 21. 
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Figure 21. Participant Is Familiar with the OHR. 
Item 22 asked if the participant's platoon made effective use of the OHR. 
Participants agreed or strongly agreed with the sentiment that their platoon makes 
effective use of the OHR by the same margin that they selected the neutral option. In both 
cases, 47.37% of participants chose the respective options: SA and A for the former, N 
54 
for the latter. More participants chose neutral than any other option. Results for item 22 
are depicted by Figure 22. 
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Figure 22. Participant's Platoon Makes Effective Use of OHR. 
Item 23: Platoon System for Reporting Hazards, Errors, and Incidents 
In addition to the regulatory OHR, many platoons developed semi-formal or non-
formal reporting systems for non-accident events. Similar to the OHR, ascertaining the 
effectiveness of these systems was an important step in assessing the need for and 
implementation of a new system. Item 23 asked the respondent if their platoon had an 
effective system for reporting hazards, errors, and incidents. The platoon's reporting 
system was felt to be effective by 76.32% of participants, as indicated by their selection 
of SA or A. Results for this item have been depicted by Figure 23. 
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Figure 23. Platoon Has an Effective System for Reporting Hazards, Errors, and Incidents. 
Item 24: Honest Mistake Reporting with No Negative Consequences 
The respondents' attitudes toward a potential reporting system wherein there are 
no negative consequences for unintentional errors were measured by item 24. 
Specifically, the item asked the respondent if he would report making one of the errors 
listed in items 12 to 15 if he made an honest mistake and knew there would be no 
negative consequences. Of the respondents, 76.32% either agreed or strongly agreed that 
they would report making an honest mistake if they knew there would be no negative 
consequences. Three respondents disagreed and one strongly disagreed with the same 
assertion. Results for item 24 have been described by Figure 24. 
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Figure 24. Participant Attitudes Regarding Reporting Honest Mistakes if There Are No 
Negative Consequences. 
Item 25: Anonymous Reporting of Errors 
Item 25 measured the respondents' attitudes regarding error reporting if the error 
could be reported anonymously. The phrasing of the item asked the respondent if he 
would report making one of the errors listed in items 12 to 15 if it could be reported 
completely anonymously. Of the participants, 68.42% responded that they either strongly 
agreed or agreed that they would report making an error if such a report could be made 
anonymously. Results for item 25 have been depicted by Figure 25. 
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Figure 25. Participant Attitudes Regarding Reporting Errors Anonymously. 
Items 26 and 27: Actions on Witnessing an Error 
Items 26 and 27 determined the respondents' experiences with witnessed errors. 
Item 26 asked the participant if he made one of the errors listed in items 12 to 15 and did 
not tell anyone. For item 26, 76.32% of participants responded that they had not made an 
error and failed to report it. Results for item 26 have been depicted by figure 26. 
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Figure 26. Participant Made an Error and Did Not Report It. 
Item 27 asked the respondent if he had witnessed someone else make the same 
errors and did not report the error he had witnessed. For item 27, 60.53% of participants 
responded that they had not failed to report another's error that they had witnessed. 
Results for item 27 have been depicted by Figure 27. 
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Figure 27. Participant Witnessed Another's Error and Did Not Report It. 
Correlation 
Items 16 through 25 were examined for correlation using rS9 chosen as the 
appropriate treatment for ordinal data. The use of two decimals has maintained 
consistency with the reporting of other statistics in the study. The correlation matrix, 
depicted as Table 3, has eliminated the values from above the "One Diagonal" for the 
variable items 16 through 25. (Negative values for the correlation coefficients have 
suggested an inverse relationship.) 
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Table 3 
Correlation Matrix for Items 16 through 25 
Item 
16 
Item 
17 
Item 
18 
Item 
19 
Item 
20 
Item 
21 
Item 
22 
Item 
23 
Item 
24 
Item 
25 
Item 
16 
1.00 
0.85 
0.00 
0.02 
-0.31 
-0.46 
-0.40 
-0.26 
-0.51 
-0.26 
Item 
17 
1.00 
0.04 
0.10 
-0.43 
-0.26 
-0.23 
-0.09 
-0.55 
-0.25 
Item 
18 
1.00 
0.88 
0.21 
0.08 
0.19 
0.32 
0.06 
-0.02 
Item 
19 
1.00 
0.26 
0.14 
0.17 
0.31 
-0.02 
0.01 
Item 
20 
# 
1.00 
0.19 
0.31 
0.24 
0.34 
0.03 
Item 
21 
1.00 
0.71 
0.35 
0.14 
0.09 
Item 
22 
1.00 
0.54 
0.06 
-0.18 
Item 
23 
1.00 
0.14 
-0.01 
Item 
24 
1.00 
0.68 
Item 
25 
1.00 
Qualitative Data 
Responses to item 28 and the interview questions were similar in that they yielded 
qualitative data, as opposed to quantitative data. Item 28 asked the participant to describe 
any yes answers to items 26 and 27. These responses were often further explored in the 
follow-up interview. Results for item 28 and the interviews were too diverse to describe 
using techniques such as tables or charts. Some common themes occurred throughout the 
responses, however. 
For item 28, four respondents stated that they had violated airspace or altitude 
clearances during emergency procedures, such as generator failures. An additional 12 
respondents stated that they had either personally missed or witnessed another operator 
miss a checklist item; however, in none of these cases did the skipped checklist item 
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result in a reportable accident. Two respondents stated that they had witnessed an AVO 
violate airspace in the interest of supporting the MPO. 
Responses to the interview questions were more diverse than those for item 28. 
Nevertheless, there were some common themes that occurred during the interviews. 
These common themes included perceptions that: 
1. Errors were more accepted in combat situations. 
2. Some errors were "no big deal" and did not warrant reporting. 
3. The system would catch serious errors; in that such errors would be caught by 
final checks or by another operator. 
4. Under the current system, errors would be met with punitive measures to 
include non-judicial punishment in some circumstances. 
Specific responses to the interview questions have been discussed in depth in the chapters 
that follow. 
Chapter V 
DISCUSSION 
The purpose of this study was to examine how voluntary and confidential 
reporting systems could best be implemented in Shadow 200 flight operations. As a result 
of research conducted in the field, 38 surveys were completed and 11 follow-up 
interviews were conducted. The results of the study represent the attitudes of the 
participants in regards to the subjects discussed in the surveys and during the interviews; 
specifically, confidentiality in reporting errors and the consequences of errors in Shadow 
200 flight operations. 
Demographics 
The first 11 items determined the demographics of the participants. The specific 
factors measured included the participant's age and rank, readiness level as both AVO 
and MPO, qualification as IP, MC, SP, and CC, hours logged as AVO, MPO, MC, and 
CC, combat experience as a UAV operator, and graduation date from the TUAV 
operator's course. Data for all UAV operators was requested from the Life Cycle 
Manager for Army UAV operators. Only the distribution of rank for UAV operators was 
available. Table 4 has depicted a comparison of rank distribution between participants 
who recorded a rank and all UAV operators. The lone warrant officer was excluded from 
the list of participating enlisted men for the purpose of rank comparison. 
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Table 4 
Comparison of Rank Distribution between Participants and All UAV Operators 
(Per C. Damboise, personal communication, April 4, 2007) 
Rank Participants Percentage All Operators Percentage 
Junior Enlisted 
PVT 8 0.10 
PFC 12 35.29 105 12.50 
SPC/CPL 3 8;82 276 32.90 
NCOs 
SGT 9 26.47 212 25.30 
• SSG 10 29.41 133 15.90 
SFC 87 10.40 
MSG 17 2.00 
Total 34 100.00 838 100.00 
The distribution of rank for the participants does not reflect the distribution of 
rank for all UAV operators. Some ranks are not represented at all in the participant 
population, some are overrepresented, and some are underrepresented. However, the 
balance of junior enlisted soldiers (i.e., Private [PVT] to SPC/CPL) and NCOs (i.e., SGT 
to Master Sergeant [MSG]) is similar for both groups. Junior enlisted soldiers comprise 
44.11% of the participants, and 45.50% of all UAV operators, with NCOs comprising the 
remainder in both cases. This is the only instance in which the rank distribution of the 
participants resembled the rank distribution of all UAV operators. 
Although no further figures were available for UAV operators from the Army, 
some meaningful inferences can be made from the other demographic data. The average 
age of participants, 25.44 years, is within one standard deviation of 28 years, the average 
age of a US Army Soldier (McDonald & Hertz, 2003). The distribution of age for 
participants also compares favorably to the Army as a whole. Table 5 depicts a 
comparison of age distribution between participants and all Soldiers. 
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Table 5 
Comparison of Age Distribution Between Participants and All Soldiers 
(Data for all Soldiers from McDonald & Hertz, 2003) 
Age Range Participants (%) All Soldiers (%) 
17 to 20 
21 to 24 
25 to 29 
30 to 34 
35 to 39 
40 to 49 
19.00 
30.00 
24.00 
22.00 
0.00 
3.00 
19.00 
24.00 
21.00 
16.00 
12.00 
8.00 
The distribution of age for the participants is similar, although not identical, to the 
distribution of age for all Soldiers. The most obvious discrepancy is in the 35 to 39 years 
age group, where there are no participants representing the corresponding 12% of 
Soldiers. Notwithstanding, visual interpretation of Table 5 suggests that the distribution 
of age for participants is comparable to the Army as a whole. 
Items 3 and 4, concerning the participants' readiness level as AVO and MPO, 
found that for both positions, greater than half of the operators (55.26% and 52.63%, 
respectively) were the lowest readiness level, RL3. The majority of RL3 participants 
suggested a slightly lower level of experience than sought. Similarly, items 5 through 8 
found that the majority of respondents were not qualified as IP, MC, SP, or CC—with 
participants responding that they were not qualified in 73.68%, 60.53%, 89.47%, and 
92.11% of cases respectively. 
The suggested lack of Shadow experience was offset by the results for hours 
logged, combat experience, and months since graduation. The Mfor AVO was 280.49 
hours; the Mfor MPO was 232.38 hours. From the experience of the researcher, both of 
these hour amounts suggested either flight hours in combat or extensive flight time in 
training. Nearly half (47.37%) of participants had reported in item 10 that they had 
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performed UAV operator duties in combat. A closer examination of the graduation dates 
revealed that the participants had accumulated experience (Mof 22 months) since they 
had graduated from the TUAV operators' course. 
Research Items 
Items 12 through 15 asked the participant to describe how frequently he had made 
a variety of errors with possible responses of never, few, and several. The items 
concerned violations of assigned altitude by more than 300 feet, airspace by more than 
0.5 kilometers, skipped checklist items, and "any other type of error that would endanger 
the UAV, other aircraft, or any personnel on the ground." Of the four items, only item 14, 
concerning skipped checklist items, did not yield a majority of never responses. For item 
14, 65.79% of respondents selected few. 
Items 16 through 25 were Likert scale items, measuring the participants' attitudes 
toward confidentiality in reporting errors and the consequences of errors in Shadow 200 
flight operations. The possible Likert scale responses were assigned numerical values 
from t to 5 for ordinal analysis, thus: SA = 1, A = 2, N = 3, D = 4, and SD = 5. This 
numbering enabled correlational analysis of the items utilizing r5, which was appropriate 
for ordinal data (Gay, Mills, & Airasian, 2006). 
SPSS software was used to generate the correlation matrix. The Likert scale 
items, 16 through 25, were the variables for the matrix. The researcher chose not to allow 
SPSS to flag significance, as textually defining correlative significance has been 
cumbersome. Alternatively, in aviation, the criterion of a minimum correlation value of 
0.3 has typically been of interest (T. R. Weitzel, personal communication, May 10, 2007). 
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Item 16 and five other items met the correlation criterion. However, only one item 
pair had a positive correlation. Positive correlation has indicated a direct relationship 
between the variables, whereas negative correlation has indicated an inverse relationship 
(SPSS, 2003). Table 6 has depicted the critical correlation of other Likert scale items with 
item 16. 
Table 6 
Critical Correlations with Item 16 
Item 
17 
20 
21 
22 
24 
Relationship 
Direct 
Inverse 
Inverse 
Inverse 
Inverse 
Correlation Value 
0.85 
-0.31 
-0.46 
-0.40 
-0.51 
Item 16 asked the respondents if they would not tell anyone if they committed one 
of the errors described by items 12 through 15. A positive correlation existed with item 
17, which asked a similar question, but alternatively assumed that the error was made by 
another operator. Negative correlations existed with items asking if: 
1. The respondent's IP or SP helped operators learn from their mistakes (Item 
20). 
2. The respondent is familiar with the OHR (item 21). 
3. The respondent's platoon makes effective use of the OHR (item 22). 
4. The respondent would report making one of the errors if there were no 
negative consequences (item 24). 
Item 17, which asked the respondent if he would report another operator's error, 
had an inverse relationship with two items. It had a correlation of-0.43 with item 20, 
which asked if the IP and SP helped learn from mistakes, and a correlation of-0.55 with 
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item 24, which asked if the respondent would report errors if there were no negative 
consequences. 
Item 18 asked the respondent if there would be negative consequences if their 
chain of command discovered that the respondent had made one of the listed errors. Item 
18 had positive correlations with items 19 and 23. Item 19 asked the same question as 18, 
but with the MC, IP, or SP discovering the error instead of the chain of command. The 
correlation between items 18 and 19 was 0.88. Item 23 asked if the respondent's platoon 
had an effective system for reporting errors. Item 18 had a correlation with item 23 of 
0.32. 
Item 19 asked if there would be negative consequences if the MC, IP, or SP 
discovered one of the listed errors. It had a positive correlation of 0.31 with item 23. This 
correlation was very similar to the correlation level of 0.32 between items 18 and 23. 
Item 20 asked the respondent if the IP and/or SP helped operators to learn from 
their mistakes. It had positive correlations of 0.31 and 0.34 with items 22 and 24,. 
respectively. Item 22 asked the respondent if their platoon made effective use of the 
OHR, and item 24 asked if the respondent would report an error if there were no negative 
consequences. 
Item 21 asked the respondent if he was familiar with the OHR. It had positive 
correlations of 0.71 and 0.55 with items 22 and 23, respectively. Item 22 asked if the 
respondent's platoon made effective use of the OHR, and item 23 asked if there was an 
effective system for reporting errors. 
Items 22 through 25 had few correlations that have not been discussed. Item 22 
had a positive correlation of 0.54 with item 23. Item 23's correlations have been 
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discussed. Item 24, asking the respondent if he would report an error if there were no 
negative consequences, had a positive correlation of 0.68 with item 25, which asked the 
respondent if he would report an error if it could be reported anonymously. 
Items 26 and 27 were dichotomous yes or no questions. They asked the 
respondent if he had either made or witnessed someone else make one of the listed errors 
and did not report it. For both items, the majority of respondents had not failed to disclose 
any observed errors. The proportion who had failed to report an observed error was 
higher in cases of another individual's error witnessed (39.47%) than the operator's own 
error going unreported (23.68%). 
Qualitative Responses 
Open-ended responses to item 28 asking the participant to describe any 
nonreported errors witnessed were varied. Four respondents stated that they had 
witnessed airspace or altitude violations while in a combat theatre. An additional three 
reported that they would not report some errors at their discretion when they were 
performing IP duties. In the follow-up interviews, participants further opined that some 
errors were "not a big deal" and could be safely ignored. One respondent stated that if 
there is no immediate danger in the error, it should not be reported. This was contradicted 
by a belief that all errors should be reported, voiced by three respondents. 
Two interviewees stated that they had witnessed willful violations of flight 
procedures. One respondent stated that he had witnessed an operator using an 
inappropriate flight mode while near an airspace border, which caused the air vehicle to 
periodically violate airspace. The respondent believed that no cause existed for this action 
other than the controlling operator's laziness. The same respondent stated that the 
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offending operator had allowed the aircraft's strobe light to be illuminated in a tactical 
situation, again believing the motivation to be laziness. Another respondent stated that 
other operators would not follow proper procedures during in-flight handoffs of UAV 
control from one Ground Control Station to another. Similarly, the respondent stated that 
operators would fail to follow the checklist on power-up and power-down procedures, 
causing some of the mission-essential electronics to be damaged. 
Four respondents supported the contention that errors were more easily accepted 
in a combat situation than in noncombat situations. One respondent stated that the 
presence of civilian instructors created a different culture wherein errors were 
considerably less tolerated. The same respondent stated that in combat the focus was on 
"getting the mission done." Another respondent related an incident wherein a student 
pilot was berated by the Air Traffic Control (ATC) authority for violating airspace. That 
respondent believed that ATC was much more vigilant about tracking UAV positions, 
and potential airspace violations, in a noncombat environment. 
Current error reporting systems were perceived to frequently result in punitive 
actions. One respondent stated that operators would often be grounded from flight duty 
for a week after an incident. The same respondent also stated that the platoon's warrant 
officer would berate the offending operator. Another respondent stated that the IP has a 
duty to report the more serious errors, especially as punishment under the Uniform Code 
of Military Justice may result. A third respondent stated that he had witnessed a 
maintainer lose a qualification as a result of an error made during a between-flight 
turnaround inspection. A fourth respondent stated that he had witnessed an operator miss 
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a checklist step after having made many transfers, and that such a mistake could result in 
non-judicial punishment. 
The results for items 21 and 22, suggesting familiarity with the OHR and the 
platoon's effective use of the OHR, were notably contradicted by results from interviews. 
Of the studied platoons, one unit had reported submitting an OHR. A respondent from 
that unit stated that only one OHR had been submitted that he could remember. 
Furthermore, the OHR had been submitted in response to an error made by another 
aircraft in the UAVs protected airspace. No OHRs had ever been submitted by the 
participants in response to an error made by a UAV operator. Respondents often 
perceived the OHR as a tool to "get other aviators in trouble." This is in direct 
contradiction to the OHR's designed purpose as an Army complement to ASRS. 
The tendency of respondents to reject the temptation to not report observed errors, 
as defined by the results for items 16, 17, 26, and 27, were explained by results from the 
interviews. One participant stated that you "can't [sic] get away with" hiding an error, 
especially in a noncombat environment. Another respondent stated that "errors get found 
out." However, some responses contradicted the participants' negative attitudes toward 
hiding errors. One respondent stated that "9 out of 10 errors don't [sic] get reported," and 
inquired "Who would you tell? No one cares." The same respondent stated that there is 
"no established reporting procedure" and that "if there is no danger, [the error] shouldn't 
[sic] be reported." Another participant stated that there is no need to report, as the 
"system is self correcting." The same participant described reporting one's own error as 
"telling on yourself." A third interviewee stated that pride, and not wanting to lose one's 
reputation were reasons for not reporting errors. That interviewee also stated that the 
71 
Military Intelligence Branch culture discouraged revealing mistakes. A fourth respondent 
stated that errors should be reported to the IP, MC, and SP; and not to the chain of 
command, citing a need to avoid micromanaging and handle the problem at the lowest 
levels of command. 
Chapter VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
The U.S. Army has made the elimination of accidents a priority. The negative 
impact of accidents has been recognized by Army leadership, and allocations have been 
made both in dollars and personnel towards reducing accident rates in all Army 
operations. The UAV accident rate has been targeted for reduction as well. Finding ways 
to reduce the historically high accident rate of the Shadow 200 UAV in particular has 
been seen as key, especially as UAV proponency has transferred from Military 
Intelligence to Aviation. 
As the Army has struggled to identify and eliminate causes of the high accident 
rate for the Shadow, many possibilities have been explored. Material and design 
deficiencies, training inadequacies, and the culture of UAV operators and maintainers 
have been identified and addressed by numerous efforts. Notably, operator errors have 
been identified as an important causal factor in Shadow accidents (Manning et al., 2004). 
Voluntary and confidential error reporting systems such as ASRS and ASAP in the air 
carrier industry have been perceived as successful in identifying and eliminating pilot 
errors. The purpose of this study was to examine how voluntary and confidential 
reporting systems could best be implemented in Shadow UAV flight operations. 
This study employed a mixed methods technique, combining quantitative data 
obtained in a survey with qualitative data obtained in follow-up interviews to determine 
the attitudes of Shadow operators towards various aspects of error reporting. The 
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demographic data described the composition of the sample. Comparisons were made 
between the demographic data obtained from the study's participants with information 
available about the populations from which the participants were obtained. Additionally, 
Likert scale data from the survey were analyzed for correlation, qualitative data were 
examined for common themes, and survey data were compared to interview data. 
The distribution of rank among the participants was not similar to that of all UAV 
operators. Some ranks were overrepresented while others were not represented at all. The 
distribution of age among participants was similar to that of all Soldiers. In age of the 
participants, the sample was representative of the population. The studied participants 
were a reasonable representation of the greater population and did represent a fair amount 
of experience. 
Items 12 through 15 measured how many times the participant had made various 
errors, including airspace and altitude violations, missed checklist items, and an umbrella 
item for any other potentially dangerous errors. Only in the case of missed checklist items 
did a majority of participants select an answer other than never. This implied rarity of 
such errors has been contradicted in several instances by qualitative data from the follow-
up interviews. Participants described an emphasis on "getting the job done" in combat 
situations, implying that errors were made and ignored in the interest of mission 
accomplishment. Similarly, every interview subject was able to describe an incident in 
which he had either committed an error or witnessed another's error. This discrepancy 
between the quantitative and qualitative data suggested a possible bias in the responses 
given by the participants. Specifically, knowledge of the fact that they were being studied 
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may have affected the responses of the participants, a phenomenon known as the 
Hawthorne effect (Gay et al., 2006). 
In contrast to the contradictory relationship between items 12 through 15 and the 
interview data, the selection of checklist errors as the most common error by the 
participants was supported by the data obtained in the interviews. Interviewed 
participants made repeated references to checklist deviations both as common phenomena 
and as a cause for incidents and in some cases accidents. This direct relationship between 
the quantitative and qualitative data suggests that checklist errors are an important area 
for improvement. 
Among the Likert scale items, several relationships meeting the minimum 
criterion of a correlation coefficient of 0.3 existed. The direct relationship between items 
16 and 17 suggested that participants held the same attitudes towards reporting their own 
errors and reporting the errors of others. The inverse relationship between item 16 and 
item 20 suggested that operators who felt that their IPs and SPs helped them learn from 
their mistakes were more likely to be forthcoming in revealing their errors. Item 17's 
inverse relationship with item 20 suggested a similar causation to the negative correlation 
between items 16 and 20. This has emphasized the importance of establishing a culture 
among IPs and SPs wherein operators are willing to admit their mistakes and are 
encouraged to learn from mistakes. The inverse relationship between admitting one's 
own mistake and items pertaining to familiarity with and effective use of the OHR (items 
21 and 22) suggested that the proper use of the OHR caused operators to be more willing 
to admit errors. This relationship was further highlighted by the direct relationship 
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between items 22 and 24. This suggested that proper implementation of the OHR has 
increased awareness of operator errors. 
The direct relationship between items 18 and 19 suggested that negative 
consequences would occur regardless of whether the MC, IP, and SP discovered the 
error, or whether the error was discovered by the chain of command. Both items had a 
direct relationship with item 23, which suggested that an effective reporting system for 
errors meant a higher likelihood of negative consequences occurring when an error was 
made. This in turn has suggested that the use of error reports obtained through reporting 
systems should be re-examined. 
The relationships existing between items 21, 22, and 23 further highlighted the 
relationship between OHR awareness and proper use, and effective error reporting. In 
addition to the previous conclusions, the importance of the OHR has been emphasized. 
The correlation between items 24 and 25 suggested that anonymity played as important 
of a role in successful error reporting as the lack of negative consequences. Although 
items 26 and 27 revealed that the more than half of respondents had not kept secret any 
errors they had made or observed, the notable percentages of respondents who had done 
so suggested that the reporting systems currently in place have been prompting some 
operators to not report errors. 
Analysis of the qualitative data and comparison to the quantitative data suggested 
a conspicuous need for improvement in existing error-reporting systems, and provided 
answers to the research questions. Interview results highlighted the dismissive attitudes of 
many operators toward what they perceived as small or insignificant errors. Many 
operators expressed a desire to keep errors confidential when possible, having cited such 
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motivations as "solving problems at the lowest levels" or avoiding "telling on your self." 
A misunderstanding of the purpose and proper implementation of the OHR was 
prevalent. Further, analysis suggested that proper implementation of the OHR resulted in 
a more healthy safety culture for the affected unit. Most disturbingly, analysis of the 
combined data suggested that respondents associated error reporting with negative 
consequences. Witnesses failed to report intentional rules violations by other operators, 
apparently desiring to avoid negative consequences. 
Chapter VII 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study sought to determine how voluntary and confidential reporting systems, 
similar to those employed in air carrier operations, could best be implemented in Shadow 
flight operations. A mixed-methods research approach, utilizing quantitative data 
gathered by a survey and qualitative data gathered during interviews, was developed to 
answer the research questions generated in regards to this purpose. Data gathered from 
the 38 survey participants and 11 interview participants revealed possibilities for further 
research as well as important areas of concern to be addressed in the existing error 
reporting systems. 
The determination by the researcher that field research was most appropriate, and 
the geographical dispersion of Shadow platoons, presented challenges in acquiring a 
representative sample of the population. These problems were exacerbated by the high 
proportion of Shadow platoons deployed in combat during the study. Due to these 
challenges, the study participants did not constitute a fully representative sample of the 
population. A lack of experience was suggested by the distribution of rank and Readiness 
Level as well as the proportion of advanced qualifications and combat experience. Future 
studies should employ a targeted sample, such as one that could be acquired using 
stratified sampling or purposive sampling (Gay et al., 2006) in order to obtain a more 
representative, experienced sample. 
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Deficiencies in the safety and reporting culture of Shadow platoons were 
discovered as a result of the study. Although a wide variety of errors were described, 
checklist errors were the most prevalent. The interviews further supported the notion that 
checklist problems were pervasive and destructive. Possible remedies for checklist-
related errors have included (a) ensuring that training emphasizes proper use of the 
checklist, (b) enforcing checklist discipline using the chain of command and IP, SP, and 
MC, and (c) finding ways to make future checklists clearer, more logical, and more 
concise. 
The OHR was identified as an area of concern. Results suggested that Shadow 
operators had a poor understanding of the proper use and purpose of the OHR. Instead of 
viewing the OHR as a useful tool and potential ally, Shadow operators viewed it as a 
means of identifying their own errors to the chain of command. The reluctance to use the 
OHR was not surprising, as results indicated that punitive actions resulting from reported 
errors were causing Shadow operators to not report some errors. Education about the 
proper use and intended purpose of the OHR has been a means of promoting a positive 
safety culture and ensuring that error reporting is not viewed as a cause of negative 
consequences. 
Further research is needed into implementing the aforementioned 
recommendations. It is possible that the existing OHR system could be used as an 
effective means of allowing Shadow operators to report errors with some degree of 
confidentiality. The effectiveness of the OHR is another subject for further inquiry. 
However, should the OHR prove inadequate for addressing the needs of the Shadow 
community, a new reporting system may be required. As the OHR has been centralized in 
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its reporting structure, a localized, responsive system (similar to ASAP) may prove 
necessary. 
Culture was relevant when comparing the experiences of operators, and 
deficiencies in culture constituted an important theme in the interview data. The 
researcher found from studying individual platoons that the safety culture of each platoon 
was different, as manifested by the attitudes of participants. Cultural differences were 
evidenced by factors such as attitudes toward error reporting and differing levels of trust 
in the IPs or SPs. Shadow platoons have tended to be insular and have experienced little 
interaction with other platoons. This has been dissimilar from traditional practice in 
manned Aviation units, wherein standardization pilots and standardization programs have 
existed at all levels between the Company level (encompassing tens of pilots) and the 
Brigade level (encompassing hundreds). An emphasis on standardization, to include 
designating personnel as standardization pilots for multiple platoons, has encouraged 
different platoons to meet the same standards, and has assisted in promoting a positive 
safety culture. Wide-spread standardization has been a key aspect of Aviation operations 
and an increased emphasis on standardization would be an appropriate addition as the 
Shadow passes into Aviation advocacy. 
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Demographic Information 
1. Age: 
2. Rank: 
(Please circle the appropriate answer) 
3. What is your current A VO Readiness Level? RL 1 RL2 RL3 Unsure 
4. What is your current MPO Readiness Level? RL 1 RL2 RL3 Unsure 
5. Are you Instructor Pilot qualified? Yes No 
6. Are you Mission Commander qualified? Yes No 
7. Are you the platoon Standardization Pilot? Yes No 
8. Are you Crew Chief qualified? Yes No 
9. Approximately how many hours have you logged in the following positions: 
AVO: 
MPO: 
MC: 
CC: 
10. Have you performed UAV Operator duties in a combat theatre? Yes No 
11. When did you graduate from the TUAV Operator's course at Ft. Huachuca (Day, 
Month, Year)? 
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Study Questions 
12. How many times have you ever accidentally flown outside 
of your assigned altitude by more than 300 feet? Several Few Never 
13. How many times have you ever accidentally flown outside 
of your assigned airspace by more than 0.5 km? Several Few Never 
14. How many times have you ever accidentally skipped 
a checklist item? Several Few Never 
15. How many times have you ever made any other type of error 
that would endanger the UAV, other aircraft, or any personnel 
on the ground? (Feel free to describe the incidents on the back). Several Few Never 
16. If I made one of the errors listed in questions 12-15 and no one else saw it happen, I 
would not tell anyone. 
Strongly Agree Neither Agree or Disagree Disagree Strongly 
Agree Disagree 
17. If I saw another operator make one of the errors listed in questions 12-15 and no 
one else saw it happen, I would cover for him/her and not tell anyone. 
Strongly Agree Neither Agree or Disagree Disagree Strongly 
Agree Disagree 
18. If my chain of command (Squad Leader, PSG, PL, etc) found out that I made one 
of the errors listed in questions 12-15, there would be negative consequences. 
Strongly Agree Neither Agree or Disagree Disagree Strongly 
Agree Disagree 
19. If a Mission Commander, Instructor Pilot, or the Standardization Pilot found 
out that I made one of the errors listed in questions 12-15, there would be negative 
consequences. 
Strongly Agree Neither Agree or Disagree Disagree Strongly 
Agree Disagree 
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20. Our Instructor Pilot and/or Standardization Pilot helps us learn from our mistakes. 
Strongly Agree Neither Agree or Disagree Disagree Strongly 
Agree Disagree 
21.1 am familiar with the Occupational Hazard Report. 
Strongly Agree Neither Agree or Disagree Disagree Strongly 
Agree Disagree 
22. My platoon makes effective use of the Occupational Hazard Report. 
Strongly Agree Neither Agree or Disagree Disagree Strongly 
Agree Disagree 
23. My platoon has an effective system for reporting hazards, errors, and incidents. 
Strongly Agree Neither Agree or Disagree Disagree Strongly 
Agree Disagree 
24. If I made an honest mistake and I knew there would be no negative consequences, I 
would report making one of the errors listed in questions 12-15. 
Strongly Agree Neither Agree or Disagree Disagree Strongly 
Agree Disagree 
25.1 would report making one of the errors listed in questions 12-15 if I could report it 
completely anonymously. 
Strongly Agree Neither Agree or Disagree Disagree Strongly 
Agree Disagree 
26. Have you ever made one of the errors listed in questions 
12-15 and didn't tell anyone? Yes No 
27. Have you ever seen someone else make one of the errors 
listed in questions 12-15 and didn't tell anyone? Yes No 
28. If you answered "yes" to question 26 or question 27, please describe what happened 
below. If necessary, continue on the back. 
89 
APPENDIX B 
The Interview Questions 
90 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
1. Please describe a situation in which you either committed an operator error or observed 
another operator commit an error and didn't tell anyone. 
2. Why didn't you tell anyone about the error? 
3. Has anyone in your platoon been punished for committing an error? 
4. What was the nature of their error? In other words, what caused them to make that 
mistake? 
5. How did the chain of command and/or the instructor pilots react when they found out 
about the error? 
6. What training resulted from the error being discovered? 
7. If a system existed to anonymously report errors committed, would you use it? 
8. If you could report your errors without fear of punishment, would you do so? 
9. What would be the positives and negatives of a system for anonymously reporting 
errors? 
10. What would be the positives and negatives of allowing operators to report errors 
without fear of punishment? 
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Spring 2007 
During the next hour, you have the opportunity to participate in a study to determine the 
need for a voluntary and confidential system for reporting errors in Shadow UAV flight 
operations. This study is being conducted as part of a graduate thesis. Your participation 
is voluntary and greatly appreciated. All information and data obtained will be kept 
confidential. The identity of participants will never be revealed, and all data gathered will 
be only be used in this study, and will not be available to anyone else. This study is in no 
way affiliated with the United States Army or the Department of Defense. 
As your facilitator and researcher, I will provide detailed guidance and answer questions 
that arise throughout the administration of the survey. Upon completion of the survey, 
some participants will be asked to participate in an interview. This interview, like the 
survey, is strictly voluntary. Please answer any and all questions to the best of your 
ability. 
Thank you for your cooperation. If you have questions or concerns regarding this study, 
you may contact me via e-mail (billjagnow@hotmail.com). As with the information and 
data obtained in the study, any correspondence will be confidential. 
Sincerely, 
William L. Jagnow 
Master of Science in Aeronautics Candidate 
Department of Applied Aviation Sciences 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
